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Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller
10.1 Introduction
The proposition that under a floating exchange rate regime restrictive
monetary policy can lead to substantial "overshooting" of the nominal
and real exchange rate is now accepted fairly widely. The fundamental
reason is the presence of nominal stickiness or inertia in domestic factor
and product markets combined with a freely flexible nominal exchange
rate. Current and anticipated future monetary policy actions are reflected
immediately in the nominal exchange rate, set as it is in a forward-looking
efficient auction market, while they are reflected only gradually and with
a lag in domestic nominal labor costs and/or goods prices. Nominal
appreciation of the currency therefore amounts to real appreciation—a
loss of competitiveness. Since in most of the simple analytical models
used to analyze the overshooting propositions there is no long-run effect
of monetary policy on the real exchange rate, any short-run real apprecia-
tion implies an overshooting of the long-run equilibrium. The transitory
(but potentially quite persistent) loss of competitiveness is associated
with a decline in output below its capacity level. This excess capacity is
one of the channels through which restrictive monetary policy brings
down the rate of domestic cost and price inflation.
One of the virtues claimed for the sharp initial appreciation of the
nominal and real exchange rate in response to a previously unanticipated
tightening of the stance of monetary policy is its immediate effect on the
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domestic price level. The domestic currency prices of those internation-
ally traded goods whose foreign currency prices can be treated as exo-
genous will decline by the same proportion as the increase in the value of
the domestic currency. To a greater or lesser extent the same holds even
for those internationally traded goods where home country demand or
production is large in relation to the world market. Both through its effect
on the prices of internationally traded final goods and through its effect
on the prices of imported raw materials and intermediate inputs, a
sudden step appreciation of the exchange rate will immediately bring
down the domestic price level. In this paper we shall argue that the effect
of such exchange rate jumps is merely to redistribute the cost of reducing
inflation over time: early gains have to be "handed back" later as the
equilibrium level of competitiveness is restored. Crucial to this argument
is the assumption of stickiness of some nominal domestic cost compo-
nent. In our model this is built in by our assumption of a predetermined
nominal money wage and through our specification of the behavior of the
"core" or underlying rate of inflation, IT, the augmentation term in the
wage equation. Subject to one quite significant qualification, the core rate
of inflation is viewed as predetermined with its behavior over time
governed by a first-order partial adjustment mechanism. It can be
thought of as an adaptive expectations mechanism for the labor market,
although we do not favor that interpretation. In our view the core rate of
inflation, which is a distributed lag on current and past rates of inflation,
stands for all the factors in the economy that give inertia to built-in trends
in wages and prices. Also, while the level of the money wage is always
treated as predetermined, IT, which is determined by a "backward-
looking" process, can make discrete jumps at a point in time. This will
happen whenever there is a discrete jump in the general price level. In
our model this can occur either if the exchange rate jumps or if there is a
change in indirect taxes. Since the exchange rate is a forward-looking
price which responds to news about current and future shocks, the
underlying rate of inflation indirectly and to a limited extent also re-
sponds to such shocks.
We start the paper with a brief review of an earlier paper of ours on the
same subject (Buiter and Miller 1981a). This is done in section 10.2 where
a simple model of real exchange rate overshooting is discussed. Section
10.3 contains a discussion of the consequences of modifying the wage-
price process of the simple model in a number of ways. It is here that we
analyze the implications of assuming flexibility of domestic nominal wage
costs. While we do not believe that such a "classical" specification is
appropriate for the analysis of a mature industrial economy like the
United Kingdom, the discussion of this case helps bring out the crucial
nature of the assumption of nominal inertia in the behavior of domestic
costs. Section 10.4 analyzes in some detail the behavior of the model with
sluggish "core" inflation. In section 10.5 we maintain the wage-price319 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
block of section 10.4 but generalize the model in a number of other
directions. The long-run real interest rate is substituted for the short-run
real interest rate in the IS equation; the expected rate of inflation be-
comes an argument in the money demand and output demand functions;
wealth effects on money demand and output demand are introduced; and
wealth adjustment via current account deficits and surpluses is incorpo-
rated in the model. Finally, gradual rather than instantaneous adjustment
of the level of output is considered. The real exchange rate overshooting
proposition survives all these modifications. Section 10.6 contains a dis-
cussion of alternative policy combinations for bringing down inflation.
10.2 A Simple Model of Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
A slightly simplified version of the model in Buiter and Miller (1981a)
is given in equations (l)-(5). All variables except for r, rd, r*, IT, 0, and T
are in logs.
(1) m-p-Q = ky-X(r-rd), k,X>0.
(2) 3,= -y(r-Dp-DQ) + &(e+p*-p), 7,o>0.
(3) Dp = 4>y + -n, <$>>0.
(4) TT = D
+m.
(5) De = r-r*-i.
The notation is as follows:
m: nominal money stock (exogenous)
p: domestic price level "at factor cost," i.e., excluding indirect
taxes (predetermined)
p*\ foreign price level (exogenous)
y: real output (endogenous)
r: domestic nominal interest rate on nonmoney assets (endoge-
nous)
rd\ nominal interest rate paid on domestic money (exogenous)
r*\ foreign nominal interest rate paid on nonmoney assets (ex-
ogenous)
0: rate of indirect tax (exogenous)
e: exchange rate (domestic currency price of foreign currency)
(endogenous)
TT: trend or core rate of inflation (endogenous)
T: rate of tax on capital inflows or subsidy on outflows (exoge-
nous)
D: differential operator, i.e., Dx(t) = (d/dt)x(t)
D
+: right-hand side differential operator, i.e.,
\ T-t
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Equation (1) is the LM curve: m denotes a fairly wide monetary
aggregate such as £M3 which consists, to a significant extent (50-60
percent), of interest-bearing deposits. We therefore measure the oppor-
tunity cost of holding money by the interest differential between the loan
rate, r, and the own rate on time deposits (rd). Equation (2) is the IS
curve. Demand for domestic output depends on the short real interest
rate and on the relative price of foreign and domestic goods. The country
is small in the world market for its importables so that it takes/?* as given.
It is large in the world market for its exportables. No explicit distinction is
made between traded and nontraded goods. Equation (3) is the aug-
mented Phillips curve. By choice of units (the logarithm of) capacity
output is set equal to zero. The augmentation term TT is identified, in (4),
with the right-hand-side time derivative of the money supply. Thus even
if m were to make a discrete jump, the price level would not jump. This is
one way of imposing the crucial property of nominal inertia, stickiness, or
sluggishness. Equation (5) reflects the assumption of perfect capital
mobility and perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
bonds. Risk-neutral speculators equate the uncovered interest differen-
tial in favor of the domestic country, net of any tax on capital imports, to
the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency. The country
is small in the world financial markets and r* is treated as given. The
assumption of rational expectations, employed in Dornbusch (1976),
Liviatan (1980), and Buiter and Miller (1981a) is equivalent to perfect
foresight in our deterministic model. It is used in equations (2) and (5).
For simplicity the foreign price level, p*, is assumed to be constant;
choice of units sets it equal to zero, so competitiveness is measured by
e-p.
The own rate of interest on money is assumed exogenous. In a competi-
tive banking system with a binding required reserve ratio h, (0 < h < 1)
on all bank deposits, the loan rate r and the deposit rate rd are linked by:
rd = (l-h)r(TD + DD)TD~
l. TD is the volume of interest-bearing
time deposits and DD the volume of noninterest-bearing demand de-
posits. If demand deposits are only a small fraction of the total, then
rd — (l- h)r. This can be used to eliminate rd from the model. The main
consequence is to reduce the interest sensitivity of money demand. We
prefer treating rd as exogenous so that discretionary changes in rd can be
used to describe policy actions to alter the degree of competitiveness of
the banking system. The dynamics of the system are conveniently sum-
marized in terms of the two state variables € and c:
(6a) i = m-p.
(6b) c = e - p.
Real liquidity, €, is a backward-looking or predetermined variable. It
only makes discrete jumps when the policy instrument m changes discon-321 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
tinuously. Real competitiveness c is a forward-looking or jump variable.
It jumps whenever e jumps. The state-space representation of the model














A necessary and sufficient condition for the stationary equilibrium of this
model to be a saddlepoint is 7(<{>X — &) - X < 0.
2 This is equivalent to the
condition that, at a given real exchange rate, an exogenous increase in
aggregate demand raises output.
It is easily verified that the long-run equilibrium has the following
properties. Output is equal to its full employment value, 0. The steady-
state real interest rate, r — Dp equals r* — Dp* + T = r* + T, since we
assume that the foreign rate of inflation is zero. The nominal interest rate
r equals r* + T + De = r* + T + Dp - Dp* = r* + T + Dm - Dp*. Long-
run competitiveness is independent of Dm, 0, and rd but improves when
r* + T increases. The steady-state stock of real money balances I de-
creases when Dm or r* + T increases, but increases when 0 or rd increases.
The immediate response of the economy to a variety of policy actions is
as follows. Overshooting by the real exchange rate of its long-run equilib-
rium value occurs in the model in response to (a) previously unantici-
1. For simplicity, the term D0 in equation (2) has been ignored. We consider it in section
10.6.
2. The equilibrium is a saddlepoint if the state matrix has one stable and one unstable
characteristic root. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that the determinant of
the state matrix be negative.322 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
pated immediate or future announced reductions in either the level or the
rate of growth of the money stock, (b) previously unanticipated immedi-
ate or future announced increases in indirect taxes (9), and (c) previously
unanticipated current or future increases in the own rate on money, rd.
All three kinds of shocks can be argued to have jolted the British
economy in the two years after mid-1979 (Buiter and Miller 1981a, b).
10.3 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting and the Wage-Price Process
A crucial component of all models exhibiting disequilibrium over-
shooting of the real exchange rate is the wage-price process. The price
equation used in this paper so far, as in many others (e.g., Buiter and
Miller 1981a; Dornbusch 1976), has a number of weaknesses. It is impor-
tant to perform a "sensitivity analysis" of the specification of this equa-
tion to establish the robustness of the overshooting proposition.
10.3.1 A Direct Effect of the Exchange Rate
on the Domestic Price Level
Even if domestic wage costs are sticky in nominal terms, so that the
money wage rate, w, can be treated as predetermined, the domestic price
level might in an open economy still be capable of making discrete jumps
at a point in time. This will be the case if the domestic currency price of
internationally traded goods is a function of the exchange rate. A conve-
nient way of representing this notion is to express the domestic price
level, p, as a weighted average of the sticky domestic money wage and the
domestic currency value of an appropriate (trade-weighted) index of
world prices, p*. Making the small country assumption that p* is given
and choosing units such that p* — 0, we have:
(8) p = aw + {\-a)e, O^a^l.
1
Equation (3) is then replaced by:
(9) DW = <!>}> + TT .
For the time being we still assume that
3. A more general approach is the following. Let pH be the price of domestically
produced goods. It is a weighted average of unit labor costs, w, and unit imported intermedi-
ate input costs: e + p*
1, i.e.,
(8') pH=plw + (l-p{)(e + p*'), 0«p,«l.
The domestic price level or consumer price index is a weighted average of the price of
domestically produced goods and the price of imported final goods: e + p*
F, i.e.,
For our purposes not much is lost by using the simpler formulation in (8). An alternative
interpretation in terms of traded and nontraded goods is also possible.323 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
(4) -n = D
 + m.
With a< 1, the domestic price level is no longer predetermined. The
jump appreciation of the nominal (and real) exchange rate in response to
(for example) an unanticipated reduction in the rate of monetary growth
will have the immediate effect of lowering the price level. However, as
long as a > 0, the earlier analysis is not affected qualitatively. We rede-
fine our state variables as follows:
(10a) £ = m-w.
(10b) c = e-w.
As before, € is predetermined (except when m jumps), and c is a jump
variable. The state-space representation of the model given in equations
(1), (2), (8), (9), (4), and (5) is:
(f>a[Xo - 7(1 - a)]
_ i
a7(X(f> — k) — X




cry\<j> — <J>A/y(l — a)
X + y(k - <J>\)




It is easily seen that (7) is the special case of (11) with a = 1. A necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique saddlepoint equilib-
rium is
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This again has the interpretation that, at a given level of competitiveness,
an increase in aggregate demand raises output. The single convergent
path is again upward-sloping, and the real exchange rate overshooting
results of section 10.2 carry over to the more plausible model under
consideration here. The main change from the previous analysis, with
a = 1, is that the exchange rate appreciation consequent upon restrictive
monetary policy actions (or increases in 0 or rd) now has an immediate
beneficial effect on the price level, although, as long as a>0, a given
percentage appreciation of e will be associated with a smaller percentage
reduction in p.
The special case a = 0 represents the "law of one price" for all goods or
instantaneous purchasing power parity (PPP). Although few proposi-
tions in economics have been rejected more convincingly by the data than
PPP (Kravis and Lipsey 1978; Frenkel 1981; Isard 1977), it is mentioned
here briefly for completeness. With the domestic price level moving
perfectly in line with the exchange rate, the wage equation (9), which still
incorporates stickiness in the level of the money wage, ceases to be
relevant to the rest of the model. The relative price of domestic and
foreign goods is constant. Real output is a function of the exogenous real
interest rate. Unless we impose the requirement that steady-state real
wages are constant, output need not be at its full employment level.
Alternatively, we could add an equation making output a (decreasing)
function of the real wage. As this model has little to recommend it, we
shall not pursue it any further here.
10.3.2 Money Wage Flexibility and Real Wage Flexibility
We now consider the case where both the money wage and the real
wage are perfectly flexible, and output is always at its equilibrium or
capacity value, 0. We can view this as the case where the core rate of wage
inflation, TX, equals the expected (and actual) rate of wage inflation, i.e.,
(4') TT = DW .
The model of equations (1), (2), (8), (9), (4'), and (5) has the following
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With both e and w freely flexible, neither of the two state variables, € and
c, is predetermined. A unique convergent solution trajectory exists be-
cause there are now two unstable characteristic roots (X"
1 and 7~
18).
The system is also recursive, with Dc independent of t and also of the
policy instruments Dm, rf, and 0. Only a real shock (such as a change in
the foreign real interest rate r* + T) will affect the dynamics and steady-
state behavior of c.
The diagrammatic representation of the system is given in figure 10.1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the Dt = 0 locus is downward
sloping. Consider an unexpected, immediately implemented reduction in
Dm. The initial equilibrium is at Ex, the new equilibrium at E2. Note that
these equilibria are completely unstable. Since the cut in the monetary
growth rate is immediately implemented, € jumps immediately from Ex
to E2 with no change in c. Monetary disinflation is costless. If we consider
a previously unanticipated future reduction in Dm, € will jump to an
intermediate position like E12 between Ex and E2 at the moment the
future policy change is announced. After that it moves gradually in a
straight line from Ei2 to E2, where the system arrives at the moment that
Dm is actually reduced. Again, there is no effect on competitiveness in
the short run or in the long run.
It is instructive to contrast monetary disturbances with a real shock,
such as an increase in r* + T, analyzed in figure 10.2. The steady-state
effect is to alter the long-run equilibrium from Ex to E2, lowering t and
raising c. If the increase in r* + T occurs immediately, both c and € jump
Dc = 0
D/=0 D/'=0
Fig. 10.1 Monetary disturbances (with money and real wage flexibility).326 Willem H. Buiter Marcus Miller
Dc = O
D/=0
Fig. 10.2 Real disturbances (with money and real wage flexibility).
to E2 without delay. If we have a future increase in r* + T, the system
jumps to an intermediate position such as E12 after which it proceeds
gradually to E2 where it arrives when r* + T is actually raised. Note that
this adjustment of the real exchange rate is an equilibrium phenomenon,
taking place at a constant level of output.
10.3.3 Money Wage Flexibility and Real Wage Rigidity
Some recent work on wage and price behavior can be interpreted as
combining the assumption of perfectly flexible money wages with the
assumption of sluggish adjustment in the real wage. The latter is treated
as predetermined because of (generally unspecified) transactions and
adjustment costs.
Consider, for example, the following specification for TT:
(4") Tt = Dp-T)(w-p), -n^O.
Equation (4"), in combination with (9), yields
(14) Dw = <\>y + Dp - r\(w - p),
or
(14') D(w-p) = 4>y-T\(w-p).
Equation (14) can be viewed as a rational expectations version of the kind327 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
of equation proposed by Sargan (1980). It is also very close to an equation
found in Minford (1980), although his equation incorporates nominal
stickiness. The state-space representation of the model with nominal
flexibility and real stickiness is given in equation (15):
(15)
Dc
- a kayr\ +
+ abk] + a
1 - a(l + 7c}))
-a)
-1 Dm
Note that real wage rigidity implies real exchange rate rigidity, as
w — p = (a — l)c. With a flexible money wage, € now is a jump variable.
The roles of £ and c as predetermined and jump variables are the exact
reverse of what they were in the model with sticky money wages (and
flexible real wages) of section 10.2. The two characteristic roots of
equation (15) are X"
1 and - {[-n(l - a) + <J>a8]/[l - a(l + <y<|>)]}. The
sign of the second root—the one governing the behavior of c—depends
on the sign of 1 — a(l + 7(j>). This has the following interpretation. Add
an exogenous demand shock / to the IS equation (2). This yields





e — p — etc,
r - Dp = r* + T + aDc,
Dc = ———y — r\c.
a - 1
The IS curve can therefore be written as328 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
/I^J\ -y(l — ot) , * , . , a(l — a)(yn + 8)
(16d) v= ^ -—(r* + T) H * ^
L
J -c
l(l + !) l(l+J)
/•
For 0 < a < 1,1 - a(l + -ycj)) must be positive if an exogenous increase in
demand is to raise output at a given level of competitiveness. We shall
make this assumption. It implies that the root governing c is negative.
Note that with equation (14') governing the behavior of the real wage,
there is no automatic tendency for the level of output to converge to its
capacity level 0. In long-run equilibrium we have (setting D[w - p] = 0),
(17) y=IL(W-p) = (a-l)2Cm
The system is still dichotomized, and the behavior of c, w — p ,y, and
r — Dp is independent of monetary shocks, but even if we start at full
employment, real shocks will not necessarily be followed by a return to
full employment. Only if r\ (minus the coefficient on the lagged real wage
in the wage equation) is zero will the system tend to full employment.
This can be shown as follows. In long-run equilibrium the IS equation is
(18) y = - y(r* + T) + hac + f.
Combining (17) and (18) gives
(19) y = («l)T17 (r* + T) _ _{oL-J)j]ba_f <f)8a — (1 — a) r\ <}>8a — (1 — a)r|
Apart from the absence of an automatic return to full employment, the
behavior of the flexible-money-wage, sticky-real-wage model is qualita-
tively the same when T| = 0 and when r\ > 0. The response to an unan-
ticipated reduction in Dm is shown in figure 10.3. An unanticipated,
immediately implemented reduction in Dm instantaneously moves the
system to the new stationary equilibrium E2 without any change in c, y, or
r — Dp. An announced future reduction in Dm instantaneously moves
the system to an intermediate position such as E12 between Ex and E2.
From there it moves gradually to E2 where it arrives at the moment that
the reduction in Dm actually occurs. This whole process again takes place
without any changes in c, y, or r — Dp.
Now consider the effect of an increase in r* + T in this model, which
changes the long-run equilibrium in figure 10.4 from El to a point such as
With c predetermined, an immediate, unanticipated increase in r* + T
causes an equal jump increase in e and w, lowering € to Ei2. From there c
and € converge gradually to the new long-run equilibrium E2 along the329 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
Fig. 10.3 Money disturbances (with money wage flexibility and real
wage rigidity).
unique convergent trajectory S'S'. A previously unanticipated future
increase in r* + T leads to an immediate jump in € down to a point
intermediate between Et and El2, such as E'12. From there € declines
gradually to Eu where it arrives when r* + T is actually raised. Then c and
€ increase gradually along S'S' toward E2.
It is interesting to see what happens to the wage equation (14') when
the exchange rate has no effect on the price level, that is, when a = 1. In
that case the price equation (8) becomes
(20a) p — w,
while the wage equation reduces to
(20b) 4>y = i\(w-p)-
Equations (20a, b) imply that v = 0 at each instant. The model now is in
many ways the same as the model with money wage and real wage
flexibility discussed in section 10.3.2 and summarized in equation (13).
The link between the real wage and the real exchange rate, given by
w — p - (a — \)c in the general model, disappears. Even though the real
wage is still predetermined (and indeed remains constant throughout at330 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
D/=0
Dc = 0
Fig. 10.4 Real disturbances (with money wage flexibility and real wage
rigidity).
0), the real exchange rate again becomes a jump variable. Because w still
is a jump variable, € also stays that way. The state-space representation of
















The response of this system to nominal and real shocks is qualitatively
similar to that described in section 10.3.2 and figures 10.1 and 10.2.
10.3.4 Rational Expectations in the Labor Market
with Money Wage Stickiness
Without changing the equation for the core rate of inflation (4") or the
associated wage equation (14) of the previous section, a single change of
assumption concerning the behavior of the money wage destroys the331 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
classical policy implications of that model. The crucial change in assump-
tion is to rule out discrete jumps in w, that is, to require w to be a
continuous function of time. The exchange rate, however, is still free to
make discrete jumps at a point in time. This change in assumption does
not rule out a rational expectations interpretation of (14). This is particu-
larly obvious if we assume that T| = 0. The behavior of this rational
expectations model of the labor market is, however, very different from
the classical behavior of the models of sections 10.3.2 and 10.3.3. Instead
it resembles the behavior of the sticky money wage model of sections 10.2
and 10.3.1. Monetary shocks lead to real exchange rate overshooting and
departures of actual output from capacity output. Note that this kind of
behavior is ruled out when a = 1. This "closed economy" representation
means that rational expectations automatically rule out departures of
actual output from capacity output.
4 With the assumed assymetry in the
behavior of c and w, and with a direct effect of e on/?, monetary shocks
will alter the real wage and the real exchange rate and cause departures
from full employment.
With the sticky money wage interpretation of equation (14), £ and c
again assume the roles of section 10.2, where £ is predetermined while c
(via e) can jump in response to news.
The response of the system to an unanticipated reduction in Dm is
illustrated in figure 10.5.
If the reduction in Dm takes place immediately, c jump-appreciates to
E°12. After that it moves gradually to E2 along S'S'. From equation (16d)
we see that this jump-appreciation of c will be associated with a fall in
output. An anticipated future reduction in Dm will be associated with a
smaller immediate jump-appreciation of c when the news arrives, say to
E\2. This jump places c and £ on the divergent path, driven by the values
of the forcing variables determining Ex, that will put them on the conver-
gent path through E2 (S'S') when the cut in Dm is actually implemented.
An equal reduction in Dm at a more distant future time will again be
associated with a smaller initial jump-appreciation of c (say to E
2U), after
which c and £ follow the unstable trajectory (drawn with reference to Ex)
that will put it on S'S' when Dm is actually cut. There always will be a
finite initial jump in c when the news of a future reduction in Dm arrives,
except in the limiting case when the announced monetary growth reduc-
tion is infinitely far in the future. One implication is that if a monetary
deceleration is planned, the loss of output and competitiveness is smaller,
the further in advance the proposed policy action is announced.
From equation (16c) with r\ = 0, we obtain:
(22) y=^ADc.





Fig. 10.5 Reduction of monetary growth (with money wage stickiness).
Assume the system starts in long-run equilibrium at t = 0. The net
cumulative loss of output
5 following a monetary deceleration is
(23)
Here c(oc) is the steady-state real exchange rate which is the same in the
initial and the final long-run equilibrium. Therefore c(=c) - c(0) is just the
initial jump in the real exchange rate. The cumulative loss of output is
minimized by minimizing the initial jump in c. This is achieved, for a
given proposed reduction in Dm, by announcing the reduction as early as
possible.
The assumption made so far, that w(t) is a continuous function of time,
can be derived from two more basic assumptions. The first is that w(t)
5. Since the adjustment path of output is monotonic in this example, y does not change
sign during the transition. The net output loss therefore also equals the gross output loss.333 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
cannot jump instantaneously in response to new information. In principle
this would still permit discrete jumps in w{t) at some t> t0, where t0 is the
instant at which new information becomes available. The second assump-
tion is an arbitrage condition for the labor market, which asserts that
efficient speculative behavior in the labor market eliminates all profit
opportunities associated with anticipated future jumps in w. This assump-
tion is analogous to the arbitrage condition we have used to rule out
anticipated future jumps in e, although its application to the labor market
is rather less convincing than its use in the foreign exchange market.
10.3.5 Gradual Adjustment of Core Inflation with Occasional Jumps
The final specification of the equation for the core rate of inflation that
we shall consider is given in equation (4'"):
(4'") DTT = i(Dp + DQ-TT), £ > 0.
This adaptive process for TT does not rule out discrete jumps in IT,
although it is consistent with our assumption that the level of the money
wage is predetermined. Equation (4'") defines n as a backward-looking





Because TT(0 is backward looking, it will be associated with a stable
eigenvalue. It is, however, not predetermined, since TT(?) also depends on
current Dp(t) and Dd(s). If p + 0 makes a discontinuous jump at t=l,
Dp + Dd becomes unbounded and so does DTT. Therefore IT jumps. This
characteristic of ix as a "dependent" jump variable—it jumps at t = t if
and only if p + 6 jumps at t — t—will be important when we come to
consider the specification of the boundary conditions of this model—our
preferred model.
It is easily verified that the following relation holds for TT:
(24) TT(0 = ir(r) + Z[p(t) -p{t-) + 0(0 - e(r)],
where
Tr(t~) = limTr(T) etc.
The jump in IT is £ times the sum of the jumps inp and 0. Rewriting (24) in
terms of the state variables, we get
(24') TT(0 - ir(r) = C{(1 - a)[c(0 - c{t~)] + 0(0 - 0(r )
If there are no level jumps in m, this becomes
(24") TT(0 - -n{t" ) = £{(1 - cx) [c{t) - c(r )] + 9(0 - 0(334 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
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We now turn to a more detailed study of the behavior of the model of
equations (25) and (26) in section 10.4. For notational convenience, we
set r* + T = 0 = rd = 0.
10.4 The Real Exchange Rate and the Output Cost of Monetary
Disinflation in a Model with Sluggish "Core" Inflation
In this section we solve the model of equations (25) and (26) for the
time paths of selected variables, using a particular set of "plausible"
parameter values. The numerical example is designed to focus on the role
of exchange rates and interest rates in monetary disinflation. We examine
the mechanism through which inflation is reduced and calculate the costs,
in terms of lost output, incurred in the process.
In our earlier paper on this subject (Buiter and Miller 1982), the effects
of real interest rates on aggregate demand were suppressed, but here real
interest rates as well as the real exchange rate are assumed to determine336 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
aggregate demand. As we show numerically, however, variations in the
parameters affecting the inflationary process systematically change the
relative contributions which each of these two "channels" of monetary
policy makes to fluctuations in output.
10.4.1 Parameter Values
To illustrate the operation of the model, we construct a "central" case
by choosing particular values for the parameters as follows:
X = 2, k = 1, a =
 3/4,<j> = £ = 8 = 7 = Vi.












The characteristic roots of the state matrix A in equation (27) are 0.375
and —0.1875 ±0.2977/, and the row eigenvector associated with the
positive root p = 0.375 is found as follows.
The row eigenvector v' associated with any root must satisfy the
condition that v'(pl — A) - Z, where Z denotes the zero vector. Norma-
lizing the eigenvector appropriately, this implies (for the parameter
values shown above) that
v2
p + (3/32) 19/16 -a13
1/64 p + (l/32) -a23
1/2 1 P~«33
= [0 0 0]
where exact values are shown in the first two columns, but the last column
is not given for simplicity. On inserting the value of 0.375 for p, we find
the elements of the associated eigenvector v to be
[vi,v2,-l] = [12/11, -8/11,-1],
as may readily be confirmed.
To ensure stability, the path to be followed by the homogenous system
must not depend on the positive (unstable) root. Avinash Dixit (1980)
has shown that for a previously unanticipated, immediately implemented
shock this can be achieved by ensuring that the product of the eigenvector
v with the initial values of the variables (measured as deviations from the
new long-run equilibrium) equals zero, that is,
i>! [€(0) - I] + v2 [TT(0) - *] - [c(0) - c] = 0,337 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
where €, TT, and c are the new long-run equilibrium values of €, TT, and c,
and i>! and v2 are elements associated with the unstable root.
Let Dm = \x. The terms measuring initial disequilibrium following an
unanticipated change in jx, denoted d|x, can be evaluated as follows:
TT(0) - TT = 7T (0) - jl, where jl denotes the new value of u,.
c(0) — c = dc, the jump in competitiveness.
From equation (24"), we know that
drr = £(1 - a)dc,
so the initial disequilibrium in TT becomes
ir(0) - 7} = (-(1 - a)</c - rf|x.
Hence the product of the eigenvector and the initial values can be
rewritten as
v2[€(l - a) dc - d\x] - dc = 0,
so the initial change in competitiveness is found to be
dc = — dix.
lC(l)
10.4.2 The Impact Effects of an Unanticipated Change in Monetary
Growth {d\x)
Using these values for p, v1, and v2, we find the initial jump in competi-
tiveness is dc = 8J|JL/3, that is, the initial percentage change in competi-
tiveness will be just under three times the percentage change in monetary
growth announced by the monetary authorities. The immediate effect
that this has on the "core" rate of inflation is
dc
dn — ^(1 — ot)dc = — = dfx/3.
8
Given the simple structure of the model, the change in competitiveness
will be associated with an immediate change in output,
dy - bade = -dc = d|x,
so real output will change on impact by the change in the trend rate of
monetary growth.
The rate of wage settlements will jump on impact as a result of both the
shift in TT and the recession, as follows:338 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
d{Dw) =
Sdr
= [<J)8a + £(1 - a)] dc = — = 5d\x/6
16
10.4.3 The Long-Run Equilibrium
In a system that is superneutral, one would not expect a change in
monetary growth to affect the equilibrium real interest rate or the real
exchange rate, though nominal interest rates will reflect the monetary
slowdown. By setting the left-hand side of equation (27) at zero and
differentiating with respect to u,, we can confirm that a change in jx has no
long-run effect on c, but changes TT one-for-one. As the equilibrium
nominal rate of interest will also move in line with |x, the impact on real
balances in the long run is - \d\x.
10.4.4 The Dynamic Behavior of the System
The dynamic behavior of the variables in the system is summarized in
table 10.1. In the first column of panel (a) are shown the "starting values"
for £, TT, and c discussed above, measured as deviations from their new
equilibrium values after a one-point slowdown in monetary growth at
t = 0. (All variables are scaled by 100, so a one-point slowdown in
monetary growth will appear as <^|JL = —1.0). The second column shows
Dt, DTT, and Dc at time zero calculated from equation (27) and from the
first column.
These starting values are chosen to place the system on the two-
dimensional stable manifold, on which the stable path of €, TT, and c can
be described by










































































aSee text for derivation of x(0) for t, IT, C; DX(0) can be obtained by multiplying the matrix
shown in (27) into x(0).
bDamping factor p = -0.1875; frequency to = 0.2997.
CB!^JC(0); B2 = [x'(0) -px(0)]/u; B = VB] + B\\ e = tan \B2IBx).
dFor which TT(0) = 1.0, and y follows same path as above (see text).339 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
x{t) = e
pt(B1cosoit + B2sin(xit) = Be
p'cos(ait - e),
where the values for 5l5 B2, B, and e are calculated from the initial
conditions in the first two columns, as explained in the notes to the table.
The same parameters, calculated in the same manner, are shown fory,
Dp, and Dw in panel (b) of table 10.1. These variables are also measured
as deviations from their new equilibrium values. For output y, this is zero
by construction, but for wage and price inflation {Dp and Dw), the new
steady state will correspond to the new rate of monetary growth (jl). For
convenience in what follows, we will assume that the newly chosen rate of
monetary growth is zero, so that there is no inflation in the new equilib-
rium.
A check on the calculations contained in table 10.1 and some indication
of how the policy works are obtained by integrating the paths shown there
for Dw and Dp. The formula
7 which gives the required integral is
p + or
where Bx and B2 are shown in table 10.1 and the values for p and co are
given in note b. Applying this we find:
]Dw{t)dt= -2.0, and fDp(t)dt= -1.33.
o o
The discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that the price level shows an
instantaneous discrete fall at time zero, which is not picked up in the
integration. The fall will be simply (1 — a)dc, where dc measures the
initial impact of the monetary policy for competitiveness. The initial loss
of competitiveness is —2.6667 (see the first entry in the third row of the
table), and 1 - a is 0.25, which provides a figure of —0.67 for the initial
fall in the price level. Together with the integral reported above, this
gives a total of -2.0 for the long-run effect on the price level. Thus the
real wage is unchanged in the long run, as one would expect from a model
which is "superneutral." (The 2 percent fall in the price level is required
to increase real balances to satisfy the higher demand for liquidity at the
lower nominal interest rate prevailing when prices are stable).
The cyclical path toward this long-run value is illustrated in figure 10.6.
In the top panel of figure 10.6, by choice of units, both the price level and
the money stock can be represented by the same line, CB, until the time
(t = 0) of the monetary slowdown. The money stock levels off at point B,
and the price level jumps down (because of the jump-appreciation of e)
and then rises for a while, as shown by the path labeled AA.
In the lower panel of figure 10.6, the paths after t — 0 for monetary
growth (the time axis) and the rate of price inflation [AA) are shown. It is
evident from the fact that the initial rate is only a little above zero that this
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policy has a prompt effect on inflation. This effect is the result of two
factors: the immediate fall in core inflation (by Vs from 1.0 to 0.6667, see
table 10.1, column 1, row 2), and the recession in output (of 1.0, see table
10.1, column 1, row 4). The factors inducing the recession will be ex-
amined with the aid of table 10.2 below.
This rapid fall in inflation might lead one to be optimistic about the
costs of eliminating inflation as measured by the size and duration of the
recession. But if we measure the output costs of checking inflation simply
by the unweighted integral of y (which means that some of the recession is
cancelled out by subsequent boom as output cycles toward equilibrium),
the following expression for the cumulative net loss of output can be
obtained:
With fl - jx = -1.0 and £<j> = 0.25, the cumulative net output cost
required to bring down the steady-state inflation rate by one percentage
point is four "point years" loss of output.
Our model ignores possible benefits from bringing down inflation
slowly because of nonlinearities in the Phillips curve which might cause
two years with 5 percent excess capacity to have a stronger counterinfla-
tionary effect than one year with 10 percent excess capacity. The evi-
dence on this is, however, by no means clear.
As a measure of economic waste, \Qy(i)dt may understate the case
where y(t) changes sign on the interval [0,3°), because periods of excess
demand will "offset" periods of excess supply. A more appropriate index
of economic waste might be the sum of the absolute deviations of output
from equilibrium. For the present case
y(t) = e
pt(BiCosa>t + B2 sin oof) = £e
p'cos(cof - e),
and p, Bx, B2, and B are all negative (see table 10.1). The formula for the
required integral (also provided by Peter Burridge) is
where a = (2e - 7r)p/2oo,
and b = irp/oo,
TT = 3.1415927,
which being evaluated with parameters from table 10.1 yields
]\y\dt = 4.0 + 1.8205 = 5.8205,
an increase of cost of 45
!/2 percent vis-a-vis the other measure (fo343 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
10.4.5 The Channels of Monetary Policy
From the construction of the model it is apparent that the costs of
curing inflation are crucially dependent on the sensitivity of wage infla-
tion to fluctuations in activity (as measured by the parameter <$>) and on
the speed with which core inflation adapts to the experience of inflation
(as measured by the parameter £). In this section we vary these two
parameters and see how the channels of monetary policy are affected by
such variations.
Specifically, the parameter (}> was doubled and doubled again, keeping
£ constant—it could not be increased much further without violating a
stability condition of the model (namely that A be negative). Resetting c|)
at its original value of Vz, the speed of adjustment of core inflation was
increased from Vi to 1, 2, and finally 5. The immediate results (of an
unanticipated slowdown of monetary growth) on output and inflation,
summarized in the top panel of table 10.2, show the recession in output to































































































aAs y = 8(e - p) - y(r - Dp) and e - p = a(e - w) = ac, so y = abc - y(r - Dp), as
shown in columns (3), (4), and (5).
bTo obtain the "impact" effect on price inflation we have to subtract 1 percent from the
figure shown for inflation in table 10.1 (which was measured from the new, lower equilib-
rium prevailing after the monetary slowdown of 1 percent).344 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
percent, see column [3]). The impact of monetary policy on inflation is
dramatically improved by increases in these parameters, however, with
inflation falling on impact by well over the reduction in the trend of
monetary growth for higher values of 4> and £ (column [6]).
Since, according to equation (2), output depends on the level of
competitiveness and on the real interest rate, the separate contributions
of these two channels of monetary policy to the initial recession are
shown in columns (4) and (5) of table 10.2. Because raising either of the
parameters cuts inflation more quickly, it also reduces the initial shock to
the real exchange rate but accentuates the effect because of the real
interest rate.
In the lower panel of table 10.2 are shown the accumulated effects on
output—a total we have used above as a measure of the costs of fighting
inflation. These costs fall sharply as either £ or cf> is increased (column [3])
but the "accumulated contribution" made by the real exchange rate falls
even more sharply (column [4]).
The exact equality of "accumulated contribution" of the real interest
rate (in the lower panel of the table) and the "impact" effect of the real
exchange rate (in the top panel) merits specific comment. It reflects both
the connection between initial shocks to the real exchange rate and
expected future real interest rate differentials in models of this sort, and
the particular elasticities used in the aggregate demand curve in our
model. In models where anticipated exchange rate changes are taken to
reflect uncovered interest differentials (De = r - r*), we find that current
real exchange rate disequilibria reflect anticipated real interest rate dif-
ferentials. Assuming for simplicity that there is no inflation overseas, we
find that, in the absence of further shocks,
][r(t) - r*(t) - Dp(t)]dt = - [e(0) - p(0)] = ctc(O),
o
where e — p — a(e — w) = ac. To obtain the accumulated real interest
effect, the left-hand side is simply multiplied by -7; while 8 times the
right-hand side shows the impact effect of the real exchange rate. As we
have chosen 7 = 8, the two "contributions" are the same. These contribu-
tions differ however for 7^8, despite the relationship of equivalence
between real exchange rate disequilibria and future real interest rate
differentials in the model.
10.5 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting in
Some More General Models
As a further test of the robustness of the real exchange rate overshoot-
ing proposition, we now generalize the model of equations (1), (2), (8),
(9), (4'"), (5), (10a), and (10b) in a number of directions. The wage-price345 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
sector (equations [8], [9], and [4'"]) and the uncovered interest parity
condition (5) are maintained throughout. The first modification consists
in replacing the short real interest rate, r — Dp, in the IS curve by the long
real interest rate, R. The (expected) rate of inflation is also entered as an
argument in the IS and LM equations. In our second modification we add
to the model wealth adjustment through the current account. The last
change of specification involves replacing the assumption of instan-
taneous adjustment of real output by one of sluggish adjustment.
10.5.1 A Modified IS-LM Block
We first replace equations (1) and (2) by (28), (29), and (30):
(28) m-p-Q = ky-\1(r-rd)-\2Dp, k,X1,X2>0.
(29) y= -iR + h1(e-p)-h2Dp, •yi,8i,82>0.
(30) DR = v[R - (r - Dp)], v>0.
The inclusion of the rate of inflation in the money demand function
allows for the possibility of substitution between money and commodities
as well as between money and bonds. The negative effect of inflation on
effective demand represents what Tobin has called the dynamic Pigou
effect (Tobin 1975). The long real interest rate R is defined implicitly by
(30). This expresses R as a forward-looking, weighted average of future





where v has the interpretation of the steady-state value of R. Note that R
is a forward-looking or jump variable.
We consider the solution of the model of equations (28), (29), (30), (8),
(9), (4'"), (5), and (10a, b) for the following parameter values: k = l,
K1 = 2, X2 = 1, 7 = 1, 8i = .5, 82 = .25, v = .05, a = .75, cj> = .5, and
£ = .5. As before, we consider the effect of a previously unanticipated,
immediately implemented one-point reduction in the rate of monetary
growth, Dm.
8 The steady-state effects are easily obtained. The rate of
price inflation, core inflation, wage inflation, and exchange rate deprecia-
tion decline by one point, as does the nominal interest rate. Real money
balances increase by 2.83 percent, more than in the original model,
because both r and Dp have a negative effect on money demand. Real
output and the long-run real interest rate remain unchanged, as does the
short-run real interest rate r — Dp. The real exchange rate appreciates by
.67 percent: lower inflation stimulates demand via the dynamic Pigou
8. The solution is obtained by using the alogrithm "Saddlepoint" of Austin and Buiter
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effect; to clear the goods market in long-run equilibrium a loss of com-
petitiveness is required.
The impact effects and dynamics are summarized in table 10.3. There
are now four state variables, €, IT, C, and R: € is predetermined, c and R
are pure jump variables, while IT, as before, has its initial value deter-
mined by equation (24"). There should be two stable and two unstable
characteristic roots. This is indeed the case for our choice parameter
values, as can be seen from table 10.3.
Speaking loosely, the cyclical behavior imparted to the original model
by the wage-price block is carried over to the present model, as evidenced
by the pair of stable complex conjugate roots. The unstable root "con-
tributed" by the long real interest rate dynamics can be identified with the
small positive root .0457.
The real exchange rate appreciates on impact by 4.8 percent, which
represents real exchange rate overshooting of 4.1 percent. Output de-
clines by 1.6 percent.
10.5.2 Wealth Adjustment through the Current Account
Current account deficits and surpluses alter the stock of net claims on
the rest of the world. If nonhuman wealth is an important argument in the
output demand function and/or the money demand function, a satisfac-
tory analysis requires the simultaneous analysis of wealth, price, and
exchange rate adjustment. Analytical models such as Dornbusch and
Fischer (1980) and Branson and Buiter (1983) are restricted to the
analysis of the cases of perfect price flexibility (Dornbusch and Fischer,
Branson and Buiter) or of a permanently fixed price level (Branson and
Buiter) by the need to limit the number of state variables to two. Our
numerical algorithm permits us to analyze dynamic models with many
more state variables.
The "current account" model replaces (28) and (29) by (31), (32), and
(33):
(31) m-p-Q = ky-\l(r-rd)-\2Dp + \3F, \3>0.
(32) y= -1R + b1(e-p)-b2Dp + b3(m-p) + b4F, 83,84>0.
(33) DF=€l(e-p) - €2y347 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
Table 10.4 Current Account Model; No Interest Income from Abroad in the








































F denotes the level (not the logarithm) of net private sector claims on
the rest of the world. Since Fcan be negative, a log-linear specification
could be awkward.
9 Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) have a wealth effect
on output demand (83,84>0) but not on money demand (A3 = 0). Note
that our IS equation now includes both the static Pigou effect (53[ra - p])
and the dynamic Pigou effect (-b2Dp). Equation (33) is the current
account equation; e^e — p) — e^ is the trade balance surplus; and e3Fis
the net interest, property, and dividend income derived from the own-
ership of foreign assets. With e3 equal to zero, the long-run real exchange
rate is invariant under all changes in exogenous variables other than
capacity output. In equation (33) the long-run value of c is zero. With a
positive value for e3 (which should be identified with r* or r), competitive-
ness and net claims on the rest of the world are always inversely related
across steady states; with e3 > 0 a larger value of F requires a worsening of
the trade balance to maintain current account equilibrium. The complete
model consists of equations (8), (9), (4'"), (5), (10a, b), (30), (31), (32),
and (33).
The following parameter values are used for all current account mod-
els: k = 1, \x = 2, X2 = 1, 7 = 1, 8j = .5, 82 = .25, 83 = .015, 84 = .06,
€l = .9, e2 = .6, a - .75, d> = .5, £ = .5, v = .05.
The case of no wealth effect on money demand (\3 = 0) and no net
interest income from the rest of the world in the current account (e3 = 0)
is considered first. The long-run and impact effects of a one percent
surprise reduction in monetary growth are given in table 10.4 together
with the characteristic roots of the dynamic system.
Steady-state claims on the rest of the world decline. There is no
long-run change in competitiveness. F and € are predetermined. Com-
petitiveness worsens on impact by about 4.5 percent. Core inflation
declines by .56 percent. The short nominal interest rate declines, but the
long real interest rate rises. Output falls by 1.5 percent. As in the previous
model, the recession and the fall in core inflation contribute to reduce
9. F is measured in terms of units of the consumption bundle. Capital gains or losses on
external assets or liabilities because of exchange rate changes and changes in the general
price level are ignored.348 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
inflation initially by more than the reduction in monetary growth. This
rather implausible feature disappears when output is treated as predeter-
mined. The current account goes into deficit after the monetary contrac-
tion, with the loss of competitiveness dominating the effect of a lower
level of output. The adjustment process is cyclical, however, and the
current account returns temporarily to surplus during the later phases of
the adjustment process. •
When we include net interest income from the rest of the world in the
current account (with e3 = .05), the outcome is not very different from
that obtained when the current account is equated with the trade balance.
Table 10.5 summarizes the results. The percentage long-run reduction in
net claims on the rest of the world does not differ noticeably between
table 10.5 and table 10.4; the real exchange rate depreciates in the long
run in table 10.5. The impact effects are virtually the same.
Including wealth as an argument in the money demand function with
X3 = .4 (keeping e3 = .05) yields the results summarized in table 10.6.
Having wealth as an argument in the LM equation reduces the long-run
increase in real money balances associated with a one-point reduction in
the monetary growth rate. The reason is that Fdeclines, thus reducing the
demand for real money balances. As a consequence, the magnitude of
the initial changes in xr, c, R, r, y, Dp, Dw, and De are all smaller than in
the versions of the model that did not have wealth in the money demand
function. Qualitatively, however, the behavior of this model is the same
as that of the earlier ones.
Table 10.5 Current Account Model; Interest Income from Abroad in the
Current Account but No Wealth Effect on Money Demand
Long-run change in F in
(%) -3.1 3.17 -1
Initial jump in F i IT C R r y Dp Dw De
(%) 0 0 -.56 -4.41 .16 -.73 -1.51 -1.16 -1.31 -.73
Eigenvalues - .2128 ±2759/; .3120; .05; -.0574
Table 10.6 Current Account Model; Interest Income from Abroad in the
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Table 10.7 Sluggish Output Model; Interest Income from Abroad in the

















































10.5.3 Sluggish Output Adjustment
In all models considered thus far, the level of output adjusts instan-
taneously. Monetary contraction, for example, brings about an immedi-
ate fall in output. This is clearly an undesirable property of these models:
the multiplier process takes time. The simplest way of modeling sluggish
output adjustment is to treat the level of output as predetermined and
make its rate of change an increasing function of "excess demand," as in
equation (34):
(34) Dy = CT[-7# + b^e -p) ~ h2Dp + 83(m -p)
+ b4F-y],v>0.
Substituting (34) for (32) in the models of the previous subsection, we
now have a model with six state variables: y, F, €, TT, C, and R. Variables
y, F, and € are predetermined; c and R are jump variables; and TT is, as
before, a "backward-looking" jump variable whose initial value is deter-
mined by equation (24").
The model should have four stable and two unstable characteristic
roots. Table 10.7 shows that, for the parameter values k= l,\x = 2,




There still is a significant loss of competitiveness in response to a
one-point monetary growth deceleration. Because output is predeter-
mined, however, the impact effect on the rate of inflation is smaller than
in the case where output can respond instantaneously. Output declines
gradually and converges cyclically to its constant capacity level.
Adding wealth as an argument in the money demand function with
X3 = .4 again weakens the long-run effect of monetary deceleration on €
and c and reduces the magnitudes of the impact effects on all non-
10. For reasons of space, only the version with net interest income from the rest of the
world in current account is considered. A smaller value of cr reduces the magnitude of the
largest stable characteristic root but does not significantly affect the initial changes in the
nonpredetermined variables.350 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
predetermined variables without changing the qualitative behavior of the
model. This is shown in table 10.8.
This "sensitivity analysis" of the real exchange rate overshooting prop-
osition convinces us that the simple model of equations (1), (2), (8), (9),
(4'"), (5), and (10a, b) is not a bad first approximation. The rest of the
analysis is therefore conducted in terms of this model.
10.6 Alternative Policies
A sudden loss of competitiveness in response to monetary disinflation
was found to be a common characteristic of the various model specifica-
tions constructed above. To see how much the initial loss of competitive-
ness contributes to the speed with which inflation is reduced (and to
reducing the output costs of eliminating inflation), we now consider
policies where competitiveness is kept constant.
For this exercise we return to the central numerical example of section
10.4. The consequences of monetary disinflation shown there (in the
upper panel of table 10.1, for example) will be referred to for brevity as
the results of pursuing policy A: a policy of permanently slowing the rate
of monetary growth without prior warning and without complementary
changes in fiscal or exchange rate policy.
If, instead, competitiveness is to be held constant at its equilibrium
value, the price level and the wage rate will move together, as can be seen
from equation (8). As a consequence, the inflation process in the model
reduces to the familiar augmented Phillips curve commonly used to
characterize closed economies. We get
(35) Dp = cj>v + TT .
(4'") DTT - i(Dp - TT) .
The stabilization of the real exchange rate precludes both the discrete
adjustment to the core rate of inflation, TT, which was a feature of the
previous policy, as well as any discrete jumps in the price level. Both TT
and p are predetermined. Given the initial level of core inflation
ir(0) = jl = 1.0, the initial value of the price level p(0), and a path for real
Table 10.8 Sluggish Output Model; Interest Income from Abroad in the
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output, equations (35) and (4'") will by themselves generate the entire
path to be followed by the price level. Note that, by construction, money
has become a complete "sideshow." One transmission mechanism, the
real balance effect, has been ruled out from the start. Now that the real
exchange rate and thus the real interest rate is also kept constant, there is
no feedback from money on real output. Since the model has the stan-
dard homogeneity properties, it will of course still be true that in the long
run the rate of inflation equals the rate of growth of the money supply. As
will become clear, however, the truism that "inflation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon" should in the current example be
turned around: money here is an inflation phenomenon.
The first alternative policy to be considered (called B) takes the path of
output to be precisely the same as that generated by the monetary contrac-
tion described in section 10.4 with policy A. This can be achieved, for
example, by adding a fiscal instrument g to the IS curve, so that
(36) y = hac - y(r - Dp) + r\g, T| > 0.
With c kept constant at its equilibrium value -yr*/a8, we can duplicate
policy A's real output path by making r\gB follow the exact path of
bacA - y(rA - DpA) - 7(1 - a8)r*/a8 under A.
1
1 The real exchange rate
stabilization together with the free movement of capital implies that
De = Dw = Dp. To so manage the exchange rate, the nominal money
stock is endogenously determined. When De = Dw = Dp, the nominal
interest rate is given by r = r* + De = r* + Dp. The LM equation (1) then
becomes
(37) m=p- X(r* + Dp) + ky = p - \r* + (k - \$)y - XTT .
With/? and TT predetermined and v determined by (36), and with c — yr*/
ah and r — Dp — r*, equation (37) determines the nominal money stock.
(Other ways of stabilizing the real exchange rate, such as a variable tax on
capital inflows [subsidy on outflows], can be thought of.) In the present
example the inflation generated by equations (35), (4'"), and (36) is the
dog wagging the money supply tail through equation (37). Given equa-
11. The constant level of the real exchange rate to be maintained under policy B is that
prevailing in equilibrium under policy A, that is, where v = 8ac - y(r - Dp) — 0, and
Dc = 0. These conditions imply De = Dw = Dp = r — r*, so the equilibrium rate is found to
be c = yr*/ah. If capital movements are not to be constrained under policy B but yet the rate
is to be stabilized at c, then one must ensure that over time De - Dp -r - r*. To find the
path of r\g which will achieve this, we equate
yA = 8CXC4 -y(rA- DpA) = Sac - yr* + T]gB = yB,
which implies
t)g = bacA - y(rA - DpA) - 7(1 - a8)r*/a8,
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tions (35) and (4'"), it will of course always be the case that the path of
inflation is determined once a path for output is specified.
The results of the alternative policy for inflation are shown in the
bottom row of table 10.1. Inflation starts at a significantly higher level
than with policy A because the starting value for core inflation TT is now
jx = 1.0. The path followed by inflation has the same damping factor p
and frequency oo as the output path, but the amplitude is smaller and the
inflation cycle leads the output cycle. The rate of inflation will, as before,
be reduced to zero at a net cost of four point-years of output. The price
level toward which the system converges under the alternative policy is,
however, higher than the long-run price level of policy A. This can be
seen from the coefficients in table 10.1. While JoDpA(t)dt- -2 for
policy A, as we have already discussed, integrating the path for inflation
under policy B yields a smaller fall, as follows:
?^ , w -p 0.5-0.7302o)
o p + (o
These results are illustrated in figure 10.6 where the path followed by
the price level and the rate of inflation under policy B are plotted
alongside those already described for policy A. In the top panel the price
level under the alternative policy proceeds from point B, without any
"jump," along a path which cycles around a steady-state level which is
one point below the line BF showing the level of the money stock, which
is one point above the corresponding steady state shown for policy A.
In the bottom panel the rate of inflation is shown starting at point B and
cycling toward zero along the path BB. Thus inflation starts at a higher
level under the alternative policy than under the floating exchange rate
case. The determination of those "starting values" and the subsequent
comparison of inflation can be seen from figure 10.7. There, labeled
SRPC#, is the "short-run Phillips curve" which determines initial infla-
tion under policy B, where IT5(0) = jL This value of TT determines the
intercept of SRPCS, and the value of y(0) determines the value of
inflation shown as DpB(0). From this point inflation and output cycle
toward the origin, as shown by the path labeled BB.
By contrast the relationship determining inflation under policy A,
(after the initial jump at time zero),
DpA(0) = cj>y(O) + TT^(O) + (1 - a)Dc(0) = <$>y(0) + ^(0) as Dc(0) = 0,
yields the Phillips curve shown as SRPQ4 which has an intercept of TTA(0)
which is lower than 7rfl(0) because of the jump induced by the revaluation
of the currency at the inception of the monetary slowdown under floating
rates. Thereafter inflation falls away following the path shown as AA.
What is apparent from the above is that the policy of fighting inflation

















Fig. 10.7 Inflation under the two policies.
associated with an overvalued exchange rate) does not lead to any change
in long-run inflation, compared to the same output cycle and a stable real
exchange rate. The loss of competitiveness does, however, reduce infla-
tion more quickly early on, as shown in figure 10.7; the early lead
established by this policy over the alternative is whittled away later when
competitiveness is regained in the boom, but we are left with the conclu-
sions that inflation is brought down more quickly with policy A, as shown354 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
by the dotted line in figure 10.7. (Inflation under the alternative policy is
shown by the solid line.)
The fluctuations of the real exchange rate can therefore be seen to have
effects on inflation not unlike those attributed to temporary incomes
policies by those who argue that the latter hold down inflation in the short
run, but have no effect on the inflation rate in the long run. If that is true,
then a temporary bout of incomes policy would change only the long-run
price level without changing the long-run growth of prices, which is what
we have found to be characteristic of the policy of permitting the real
exchange rate to vary.
10.6.1 "Efficient Disinflationary Policies"
1
2
Once we permit changes in the indirect tax rate, 0, we have a way of
costlessly reducing inflation. Consider the money demand function and
the wage equation:
m— p — 0 = — \r + ky.
Dw — 4>_y + 7T.
Given a reduction in the rate of monetary growth by d\x = jx - jl, we can
easily calculate the change in 0 required to jump TT to its new long-run
equilibrium value, jl. Holding p constant, equation (24) shows that
d*n(t) = £,dQ(t). The required change in 0 is therefore given by
From the money market equilibrium condition, we obtain that, since the
long-run interest rate changes in line with |x,
d(m - p — 0) = — Kdr — - \d[x.
Holding p constant, this yields
dm - dd = — \d\x.,
or
Therefore a change in the rate of monetary growth by d\x, accompanied
by a change in indirect taxes by £,~
ld\x and a change in the level of the
nominal money stock of (-\ + £,~
l)dti, will immediately move the sys-
tem to the new steady-state equilibrium with the lower rate of inflation.
Output and the real exchange rate are unaffected. With our choice of
parameter values (X = 2 and £ = .5), d% = 2d|x and dm = 0.
The mechanism permitting the required reduction in inflation to be
brought about without loss of output is the following. First, the cut in 0 (in
general, together with the change in m) permits the long-run change in
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the stock of real money balances to be brought about immediately
without any need for a jump in nominal prices, including the exchange
rate. Second, the cut in 0 achieves the immediate change in the core rate
of inflation to its new long-run value. The use of indirect taxes to facilitate
the process of bringing down inflation has been specifically advocated by
Okun (1978).
Alternatively, incomes policy can be used to jump TT. If incomes policy
can be identified with a once-and-for-all reduction in IT, without any other
"overwriting" of the behavioral equations of the model, then it will lower
the cost of disinflation. If monetary policy changes or announcements
themselves directly change IT, as is the case in the model of section 10.2,
then disinflationary monetary policies will also be "efficient," in the sense
that we are using that term here.
10.7 Conclusion
After a summary of various approaches to the modeling of the in-
flationary process in an open economy with a floating exchange rate, we
have studied the way in which a monetary slowdown might be expected to
work in an economy where the money wage is predetermined and core
inflation is sluggish and adjusts to actual inflation with a significant lag.
The proposition that real exchange rate overshooting occurs in response
to nominal shocks is found to survive a wide range of generalizations of
the Dornbusch (1976) model. These include the addition of static and
dynamic Pigou effects to the IS curve, the inclusion of wealth adjustment
through the current account, and the replacement of instantaneous out-
put adjustment by a gradual process.
Despite the sluggishness in the core inflation process, we found that
core inflation can be reduced quickly by jumps in the price level induced
by jumps in the exchange rate. In the many variants of the model used to
focus on this particular aspect of the monetary transmission mechanism,
we found that a monetary slowdown will cut inflation promptly via its
impact on the nominal and the real exchange rate. Indeed, in our central
numerical example of sections 10.4 and 10.6, the inflation rate responds
immediately by almost the full extent of the monetary slowdown! This
reduction of inflation follows, in our example, from the effects of
announced monetary policy on the exchange rate and, less significantly,
on the current real interest rate. The appreciation of the exchange rate
cuts the inflation rate in two ways, first by reducing core inflation, and
second by cutting the level of output. Both of these effects involve sharp
changes in the real exchange rate.
Since in the central example money is "superneutral," however, such
changes in the real exchange rate and in real output must ultimately be
reversed. Pursuit of a constant growth rate of money generates a cyclical356 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
convergence for these variables. The net output costs associated with a
steady-state reduction in inflation are found to be given by a simple
formula, d\x/^, where d|x shows the change in steady-state inflation, cj> is
the slope of the short-run Phillips curve, and £ measures the speed of
adjustment of core inflation. Thus for £ = <j> = V2, the net output loss
associated with reducing monetary growth and steady-state inflation by 1
percent is 4 point-years of GNP.
For comparison we considered an alternative where the real exchange
rate was held constant but output was constrained to follow the same path
as before. Such an alternative, whose net output loss is, of course,
identical, was found to achieve the same effect on steady-state inflation,
but the path taken by inflation was different. The prompt anti-inflation
success from the loss of competitiveness being absent, inflation starts
from a higher level under this alternative.
In a superneutral model, with core inflation modeled in the way we
have, it turns out that any path for output which exhibits a cumulative
four point-year loss of output will (if £,$ =
 lA) reduce steady-state infla-
tion by 1 percent, irrespective of the path taken by the real exchange rate
(provided it starts and finishes at the same level). Thus the freedom to
vary the real exchange rate to reduce inflation does not succeed in
reducing the output costs of changing steady-state inflation; it does,
however, change the time path of inflation relative to other policies which
exhibit the same output path.
While the numerical model makes no claim to being a realistic model of
the United Kingdom, we would point out that the sort of output costs
associated with reductions in medium-term inflation in Treasury evidence
to the Treasury Committee suggested a figure of four point-years of
output for each one point off medium-term inflation. A more detailed
analysis of simulations on an earlier version of the Treasury model, when
the slope of the Phillips curve was flatter and the mean lag of core
inflation longer, showed even higher costs (see Miller 1979).
In considering "efficient" disinflationary policies, we noted that a cut in
indirect taxes could reduce the output costs of curing inflation by securing
an immediate jump reduction in the price index at market prices and in
the core rate of inflation. In our model a reduction in the rate of growth of
money by d[i accompanied by a cut in indirect taxes of £,~
id[x will
immediately and costlessly achieve a reduction in steady-state inflation of
d|x. (In general, a change in the level of the money stock will also be
required.)
In the United Kingdom, a one point cut in value-added tax (VAT) is
reckoned to cut the rate of indirect taxation by half a point. A four point
reduction in VAT would therefore avoid the four point year of output
loss otherwise associated with a point reduction in monetary approach.357 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
The Thatcher administration's decision to raise VAT by eight points early
in its first term of office, at the same time that a program of successive
reductions in monetary growth was announced, would in our model
increase the cost of bringing down inflation. In the short run, however,
the adverse consequences of the VAT increase on the price level are
countered by the appreciation of the exchange rate.
Those who argue that incomes policies can secure a step reduction in
core inflation would, of course, advocate their use as a way of cutting the
output costs of reducing inflation (see, for example, Tobin 1977). We
have not examined this case in detail in this paper. We have, however,
considered (in Buiter and Miller 1981a) the possibility that announced
monetary policy could immediately and directly reduce core inflation in
just such a fashion. If announced monetary policy has this sort of direct
expectational effect, then it will save output costs, just as a similarly
successful incomes policy would. If, however, monetary targets only
secure immediate effects on core inflation by a sudden loss of competi-
tiveness, this will not constitute an "efficient" way of reducing inflation.
In any case, full immediate adjustment of core inflation to its new
equilibrium value is not sufficient in our model for avoiding all output
costs of bringing down inflation. The long-run increase in the stock of real
balances associated with a reduction in the rate of growth of the money
stock requires an immediate increase in the level of the nominal money
stock path if the costly alternative of lowering the level of the path of the
sluggish money wage is to be avoided.
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Comment Robert P. Flood
The NBER Conference on Exchange Rates and International Macroeco-
nomics has presented me with the welcome opportunity to comment
formally, for the second time, on the work of Buiter and Miller (B-M)
1
concerning the output cost of disinflation. In my first comment
2 I dis-
cussed some technical aspects of the sticky-price rule adopted by B-M.
Presently, however, I will discuss some deeper aspects of the B-M meth-
odology, which are typical in modern macroeconomics. In particular,
B-M assume that an elected policy authority may reduce drastically a
country's rate of monetary growth without opposition from other impor-
tant political groups in the country. This assumption manifests itself when
B-M solve their model conditional on agents' believing that the current
policy regime will last indefinitely.
An alternative methodology is to model agents' beliefs concerning the
possibility that the current political regime will not last indefinitely. In
particular, if a regime's policies are perceived to be too costly, then the
regime may be ousted at the next election or the regime may disavow its
former policies in order to be reelected. In either case, a policy which is
perceived to be too costly is reversed at the next election.
When a political regime comes to power and attempts to lower the
inflation rate by lowering the money growth rate, the effectiveness of
their policy will depend on two elements: first, their ability actually to
lower the money growth rate, and second, their ability to convince agents
that the lowering of money growth is permanent. Since a regime can be
ousted, a fine line must be tread: the lower the money growth rate, the
higher the probability agents attach to the demise of the current regime at
the next election. If the opposing political group favors a higher money
growth rate than does the current regime, then raising the probability of
the current regime's demise will raise the expected long-term rate of
money growth. Thus, a lower current rate of money growth may raise the
expected long-term rate of money growth and may not have the desired
effect of lowering the inflation rate.
Sargent (1981) has discussed the importance of a country's political
climate as a precondition for a successful low-cost transition from high
Robert P. Flood is a professor in the Department of Economics at Northwestern
University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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1. This comment is intended to apply equally to Buiter and Miller (1982) and Buiter and
Miller in this volume.
2. My first comment is Flood (1982).360 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
inflation to low inflation. My intention in this comment is to provide a
formal model of the political-economic interaction determining the suc-
cess or failure of a political regime's attempt to reduce a country's
inflation rate. The methods I use are drawn from a series of papers I have
written with Peter Garber; especially relevant is Flood and Garber
(1982).
A Model with Political Stochastic Process Switching
The framework for analysis is a stripped-down version of the B-M
model. Its primary equations are:
(1) mt-pt= -\(Etet+1-et), \>0,
(2) Pt+i-Pt = <byt + EtPt+i-Pt, <!>>0,
(3) yt = h(et-pt), 5>0,
where, in logarithms, mt = money stock;/?, = home goods price level; et
= exchange rate; yt = demand for home goods; p, = the value of/?, such
that yt = 0; and Et = mathematical expectation operator conditioned by
full information at time t, which includes all variables dated t or earlier.
Equation (1) gives money market equilibrium; the supply of real money
balances (m, - /?,) equals the demand for them [-X(Etet+1- et)].
3 Equa-
tion (2) is a price adjustment function stating that inflation (pt+i — pt)
equals a function of excess demand for goods (<j>y,) plus a "core" inflation
rate, Etpt+1 —pt. The variable yt is the excess demand for home goods, since the natural rate of output is normalized to zero; pt is a predeter-
mined variable, and output is assumed to be equal to the demand for it, yt.
Equation (3) specifies that output demand depends on the relative price
of the home goods. The foreign price of foreign goods is constant and
normalized to zero.
Since my version of the model appears to be quite different from that of
B-M, I will describe it in more detail. First, I have used a discrete-time
model, while B-M use a continuous-time one. This alteration is intended
only to facilitate the stochastic analysis which follows. Second, I have
ignored the foreign interest rate and a scale variable in the money
demand function and the real rate of interest in the demand function for
home goods; these are first-pass analytical simplifications. Third, the
"core inflation" term in (2), Etp[+1—pt, reflects my own preferred
specification rather than that of B-M. In the present setup, pt = et.
4
3. I have followed B-M, section 10.2, in deflating nominal money balances by the
domestic price of home goods. Apparently, B-M follow Dornbusch (1976) in adopting this
simplification. Using this deflator leads to the B-M, section 10.2, definition of inflation,
pl+ j — pt, which I also use. The algebra of the model would be more difficult if a consumer
price index deflated money balances and defined inflation. However, such complications do
not reverse B-M's results or mine; thus they are avoided.
4. The price adjustment rule I use is based largely on the work of Michael Mussa and is
applied to the open economy in his 1982 paper.361 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
In this model, et is a "jumping" variable and pt is a predetermined
variable. Since pt = et, pt also is a "jumping" variable.
The only exogenous variable in the model is the money supply. Thus,
an exchange rate solution for the model is an expression giving et as a
function of the predetermined variable pt and all expected future values
of mt. Such a solution is
00












0 TTT ' i = 0,1,2,
\ 1 + A./
Note that XT=oyt = 1 + (l/8<j>\) > 1, as in Dornbusch (1976).
I assume that two money supply processes are relevant to agents'
calculations of the infinite sum in (4). The current regime expands money
according to
(5) mf+I- = |X!+ »!,+,•_!+ vr+l-, i = l,2,3,...,
where vt+i is a zero mean disturbance which is not serially correlated. The
opposition regime, if in power, would expand money according to
(6) mt+i = |x2 + m,+l-_i + vt+i; i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , jx2> |xx.
The current regime, though, is definitely in power from t to t + 1. How-
ever, at t + 1 there will be an election and the current regime will be
deposed with probability IT, where IT is the probability agents at t attach to
the current regime's being defeated in the t+\ election. For simplicity, I
assume that the t + 1 election is the only future election.
5 The probability
TT is determined by a simple model of the political process. In particular,
(7) >n=pr{[y[+l\OR]<y},
where pr{x <y) is the probability that x is less than y for any x and y.
Thus, TT is the probability that yt+1, conditional on the continuation of the
old regime, [yt+ x|OR], is less than the minimum level required to main-
tain the current regime's majority, y. Intuitively, (7) formalizes a political
process which works as follows. The electorate at t + 1 examines the state
5. Allowing a single election makes the present setup a special case of Flood and Garber
(1982). My paper with Garber is more general than the present model in that our joint work
allows calculation of an equilibrium when the endogenous stochastic variable (yr+;) may
pass a critical barrier (y) at any future date.362 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
of the world at t + 1 and calculates the level of yt+1 which would prevail if
the old regime were left in power. If this conditional yt+x is below the
minimum (y, y) required to preserve the current regime's majority, then
the electorate ousts the old regime and elects a new regime. By assump-
tion, the new regime will follow a monetary policy no more restrictive
than that of the old regime.
To complete the solution of the model, we must calculate ir and use TT
in the infinite sum in (4) to find et. Once et is found as a function of the
current state, we may use the expression for e, in (2) to find the inflation
rate. The first task then is to determine IT.
Forwarding equation (3) and using the definition of TT from equation
(7), obtain
(8) v = pr{b([et+1\OR]- pl+l)<y},
where [e,+ 1|OR] is the value of et+x conditional on the old regime's
continuing in power at t + 1; pt+x is determined at t and is an uncondi-
tional realization. To find [e,+ 1|OR], use (5) in (4), both forwarded
appropriately, to obtain
(9) k+i|OR] = pA+1 + (l - p)/w,+ 1 + (l - p)mx.
Since mt+1 is generated by equation (5), we may use (9) and (5) in (8) to
obtain
(10) -rr = pr[vt+! < Z + pt+! - m, - |Xi (1 + M]»
where Z = y/8(l-f3).
To make more progress, a specific assumption must be made about the
probability density function (p.d.f.) governing vf+1. In particular, I
assume that vt+i (i - 0, 1, 2, . . .) has a uniform p.d.f., which is
f{vt+i) = l/(2-n); -n < vt+i <-n, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
vt+i< -r\, i= 1,2,3,
It follows that the probability that v,+1 is less than any number x is given
by
(12) pr(v[+l<x)= J ±dvt+ ^
2 2r\
when -r\ < x < -n. If A: lies outside the [-r\, t]] bounds, then
pr{vt+! < x) becomes either 0 or 1 depending on which bound is violated.
In what follows I assume that -n is large enough that the formula given in
(12) is applicable.
Combine (12) and (10) to obtain363 Real Exchange Rate Overshooting
(13) 7T = -L h + Z + pt+1 - mt - ^(1 + X)].
2*1
The terms mf, r\, Z, and 1x2(1 + X) are either state variables at t or
parameters; however, pt+1 is an endogenous variable at t which may be
expressed in terms of the state variables and parameters.
Using equations (2), (3), and the definition of pt+i, obtain
(14) pt+1 = (1 - %)pt + (6 - l)et + Etet+U
where 6 = c}>8 and the stability of the model requires G < 2, which I
assume.
6 Equation (4) allows us to express et and Etet+l as functions of pt,
pt+i and expected future values of money. These expressions are
7J Etmt+1
(15)
+ (l-ir) 2 7/^('«r+,-OR)
2




) 1 + X^l-
11^2 7(.Ef(mr+I.|OR) ' = 2
where Et(mt + i\OR) and E,(m, + /|NR) are expectations of mt+i con- ditioned on time t information and on the old regime (OR) and new
regime (NR), respectively. The law of iterated expectations allows us to
convert the t+1 expectations in the expression for e,+ 1 into t expecta-
tions in (16).
Under condition (OR), equation (5) governs m,+i, and under (NR)
equation (6) governs mt+i. Use this information in (15) and (16) and
combine those results in (14) to obtain
(17) p,+ 1 = (l-e)/7, + em,
To determine TT, substitute (17) into (13) and rearrange to yield
6. This is not a stability condition in the sense of assuming away "bubbles." It is a
condition for the stability of "market fundamentals" in the sense of Flood and Garber
(1980). To see this point clearly, examine equation (17) with (JL, — JJL2 = 0.364 Willem H. Buiter/Marcus Miller
( (i + \)h + z + (i e)( Pt -mt-
In interpreting (18), recall that -n must be large enough to ensure
- r\ < Z + pt+l - mt - ix^l + X) < r\. This condition, along with the sta-
bility condition 6 < 1, allows dTr/d^ < 0, which says that a reduction in
the current money growth rate increases the chance that the old regime
will be voted out at the next election.
The current inflation rate ispt+1- pt. Sincept is predetermined at t, we
may use (17) to obtain
(19) .w .
From (19), when ^ — \x2, a reduction in current money growth ((xx) must
reduce inflation as TTX/(I + X) < 1. However, when JJLX is less than |x2, then
a further reduction in |x: may increase inflation as d-n/d^ < 0. Indeed, by
setting (19) equal to zero, we find that value of (Xj which minimizes the
current inflation rate. This value is obtained by substituting the derivative













where \x,x is the inflation minimizing value of ^ and TT - iTdo,!).
Final Remarks
This comment is not an appropriate place to draw out the nonstandard
implications and interpretations of the type of political-based stochastic
process switching model presented here. However, this simple model
does serve to point out the importance of such considerations. Few
propositions in monetary economics are as widely accepted as the prop-
osition that decreasing the money growth rate will lower the inflation
rate. However, it has been shown presently, in a simple example, that
when an opposition party is lurking in the background with a policy more
expansionary than that of the current regime, reducing the money growth
rate need not reduce inflation.
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Comment Jiirg Niehans
It is a pleasure to comment on the interesting and important paper by
Buiter and Miller. The paper is rich both in analytical content and in
policy implications, and it contains the seeds for fruitful modifications
and elaborations. It can generally be described as an effort to apply the
underemployment version of Dornbusch's exchange dynamics model to
the stylized facts of British monetary policy. By and large, this effort is
successful and I believe with relatively few modifications and extensions it
could be made even more successful. The first four of my comments
concern the policy implications of the paper, while the remaining com-
ments have to do with the way it stylizes the facts.
1. In comparing policy alternatives, Buiter and Miller use the gain or
loss of output, measured in percent years, as their main yardstick. They
estimate that a 10 percent reduction of inflation by a retardation of
monetary expansion costs 4 percent of output for ten years. This figure
seems high to me, but it should be noted that Buiter and Miller do not
really use it as an empirical estimate but rather as an illustrative bench-
mark, based on plausible, but freely chosen parameters.
2. Buiter and Miller compare this policy with an alternative in which
cuts in government expenditures are used to move output along the same
track while monetary policy is reduced to the passive role of preventing
exchange overshooting. They demonstrate that this "fiscal" variant re-
duces inflation by the same amount as the "monetary" variant but leaves
the price level permanently higher. In fact, the aggregate output costs of
disinflation are the same, regardless of the behavior of the exchange rate.
The message from this strong result seems to be threefold. First, while the
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overshooting of the exchange rate strengthens the impact effect of a
disinflationary policy, this early benefit is balanced by the apparent
recurrence of inflation in later stages. Second, to minimize both early
illusions and later disappointments, the success or failure of disinflation-
ary policies should be measured by their effect on "sticky" domestic
prices and not on exchange-sensitive international prices. Third, once the
variability of output is added to the loss function, overshooting may make
things much worse, and it may be dangerous to regard it with "benign
neglect." After all, governments may not survive to the later stages.
3. In the model, a reduction in money growth by 1 percent produces an
instantaneous appreciation of the real exchange rate by almost 3 percent.
The order of magnitude seems plausible, but while Buiter and Miller
envisage monetary contraction as gradual, British monetary policy,
though committed to gradualism, actually produced an instantaneous
reduction by about 10 percent. According to the model, this should have
produced an appreciation of sterling by 28 percent—and this is not far
from what it actually did.
4. Buiter and Miller suggest that inflation can be eliminated painlessly
by combining a reduction in the growth rate of the money stock with a
one-time increase in its level and a one-time reduction in indirect taxes. I
confess that I find this proposal unconvincing. The monetary part of the
proposal reminds me of a general who orders his embattled troops to
counterattack from a point ten miles behind their present lines. While it is
easy to explain such an order on the map, it clearly invites disaster. The
fiscal part of the proposal is based on the notion that a one-time cut in
indirect taxes lowers the rate of expected inflation, which I find hard to
understand.
5. My remaining comments have to do with the way Buiter and Miller
model British monetary policy. They define the money stock as some-
thing like sterling M3. Disinflation policy is described as a retardation in
the supply of this aggregate, and it is shown how this would produce a real
appreciation of sterling and a recession in output. In fact, in 1979-80 the
Thatcher government produced an acceleration in the supply of £M3 by
about 50 percent. But far from producing a real depreciation of sterling
and a stimulation of output, the effect was similar to what Buiter and
Miller expect from monetary contraction. I conclude that there must be
some flaw in the specification of the money supply. The problem dis-
appears if the money supply is reinterpreted as the monetary base (or
perhaps Ml). As a matter of fact, the Thatcher government, largely
unintentionally, reduced the rate of expansion of base money drastically,
cutting it from about 14 percent to less than 4 percent virtually overnight.
Overshooting and recession appear as the normal concomitants of such
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6. There is a related problem with interest rates. The model contains
two rates, one for monetary assets like time deposits, the other for
nonmonetary assets. The rate on monetary assets is regarded as exoge-
nous and so is the money supply. I do not see how this can be correct.
Either the government can set the quantity of money and let the interest
rate adjust or vice versa, but it cannot set both. (It should be noted that
the zero rate on currency is exogenously given in any case.) In the United
Kingdom, the relevant exogenous variable was, in fact, the minimum
lending rate, represented in the model by rd. (It remains to be seen to
what extent recent modifications have really changed this.) The money
supply, on the other hand, was endogenous, public and private borrowers
being supplied with any amounts demanded at that rate. It would be
interesting to know what the model has to say about the implications of
using the discount rate as the main policy variable. Of particular interest
would be the question of whether a system that is stable for a money
supply policy is also stable for an interest policy. Wicksell taught us that
usually this is not so, at least if the accumulation of real capital and
international reserves are disregarded.
7. If an endogenous variable is treated as exogenous, one would
expect a model to be overdetermined. The Buiter and Miller model,
however, is not. Overdetermination is avoided, I am inclined to conjec-
ture, by omitting an equation that really should be part of the model,
namely the interest-parity condition for monetary assets. Shouldn't the
time deposit rate on sterling be related to the Eurodollar rate and the rate
of sterling depreciation? I see no valid reason to recognize interest parity
for nonmonetary assets but not for monetary assets. If both relationships
are included, the differential between the two interest rates is determined
by the rest of the world and thus exogenous. (Alternatively, the two
interest-parity conditions could perhaps be interpreted as relating to
different maturities. The term structure of interest rates would then
reflect the term structure of expected exchange rates.)
8. Buiter and Miller let the demand for real balances depend on the
difference between the two interest rates but not on their absolute level.
Once this difference, as just suggested, is exogenously determined, U.K.
interest rates can no longer influence the demand for real cash balances.
The consequences for the model would be far-reaching. I believe that the
demand for real balances should, in fact, also depend on the absolute
level of interest rates. (After all, a substantial part of the money supply
still bears no, or virtually no, interest.) As a matter of fact, it was
precisely the exogenous increase in the MLR that called forth the con-
traction in the demand for base money.
9. In the Buiter and Miller model, an acceleration in the money supply
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This is consistent with the observation that the expansion of the growth
rate of £M3 in 1979-80 was indeed associated with a marked rise in
interest rates. However, the reason for the parallel short-run association
of monetary expansion and interest rates seems to be different in reality
from what it is in the Buiter and Miller model. In the model, an expansion
in the money supply raises the demand for real cash balances, and thus
interest rates, through an expansion of output. Actually, the British
economy experienced recession. I would be inclined to suggest that the
exogenous increase in the MLR, while leading to a sharp contraction of
output and a marked decline in the demand for base money, also brought
about a still larger increase in the demand for interest-bearing deposits
and thus an expansion in (endogenous) £M3. As a result, £M3 gave
tragically misleading signals about monetary policy, acting like a distort-
ing mirror in which a person sees himself getting fatter while in fact he is
losing weight.
10. In the Buiter and Miller model, as in the underlying Dornbusch
model, the effects of monetary policy and overshooting for foreign trade
and capital flows are not made explicit. I believe this is a major limitation
which, in the light of recent contributions in this area, could probably be
remedied without excessive difficulty. This extension would have to take
into account that any trade deficits or surpluses caused by changing
competitiveness must be consistent with the desired accumulation or
reduction of foreign assets. To be relevant for policy questions, this
extension would also have to take account of the J-curve lags in the
effects of exchange rates on trade.
To sum up, during the last two years, British monetary policy greatly
suffered from the Radcliffian notion that the differences between money
and other liquid assets are too small to matter. This notion, it seems to
me, also casts a slight shadow over Buiter and Miller's excellent paper.
Nevertheless, there is enough light in this paper to make it an important
contribution to our understanding of monetary policy under floating
exchange rates.